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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
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Regulatory regimes are actively discussing 
macroprudential policy. Korea pursued a countercyclical 
macroprudential approach to prevent the overheating 
of mortgage lending and to minimize the risk of loan 
default. The Korean financial supervisory authority 
made adjustments in response to both the condition of 
the housing market and trends in mortgage loans. The 
lessons learned from the Korean experience are applicable 
to other situations. First, regulations regarding loan-to-
value and debt-to-income ratios and other restrictions 
This paper is a product of the Financial Systems-Prudential Oversight Department, Financial and Private Sector Development. 
It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development 
policy discussions around the world. Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.
org. The author may be contacted at schang2@worldbank.org.  
on mortgage lending can be employed as an important 
part of a countercyclical framework. Next, measures 
need to be applied in a timely manner and according 
to the specific conditions of each country. Finally, 
authorities should preemptively prepare macroprudential 
instruments before banks enter a period of rapid 
mortgage lending to avoid reckless mortgage lending 
operations and weaken any speculative motive in the 
housing market. 
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1. Introduction  
“The procyclicality of the banking sector can amplify cycles in the real economy and financial 
market instability can lead to severe downturns.”1 
--- OECD Economic Outlook, Preliminary Edition (2010, p. 313) 
Macroprudential2 measures to moderate financial cycles and to manage systemwide risks have 
been actively discussed since the onset of the global crisis relating to the subprime mortgage 
boom and burst. However, it is difficult to find the appropriate level and timing for 
macroprudential policy since policies can significantly affect the economy, including the 
financial system. 
Macroprudential tools are capable of targeting particularly weak sectors and can impact credit 
growth. Specific measures include setting limits on loan-to-value (LTV) ratios in mortgage 
lending, on loan servicing costs relative to income, and on the use of unusual mortgage products. 
However, these measures may present several difficulties when put to use. Relevant issues 
include: when these instruments should be put into effect, which indicators to consider, and 
whether the measures should obey a simple rule or allow for more discretion (OECD, 2010). 
This paper provides an overview of the countercyclical approach taken by the Korean financial 
supervisory authority (the Financial Services Commission/Financial Supervisory Service, 
FSC/FSS)3 in response to rapidly growing residential mortgage loans4 in the boom cycle of the 
housing market (Figure 1), and discusses relevant policy implications relating to the concepts 
and use of macroprudential instruments.  
This paper describes the various schemes applied to mortgage loans, from indirect supervisory 
approaches like regulations on loan loss provisions, to direct approaches5 like the regulatory 
LTV ratio.6  Other countries have used countercyclical provisioning, LTV ratios, and direct 
controls on lending in particular sectors to manage financial system procyclicality (Caruana, 
2010).  In comparison, Korea’s case seems to be more dynamic and the applied criteria seem to 
be more restrictive. This difference in approach is attributed to several years of fierce lending 
competition by banks and rampant speculation by borrowers in housing markets, especially in 
the Seoul metropolitan area.   
                                                        
1 “Procyclicality refers to the mutually reinforcing interactions between the financial and real sectors of the economy 
that tend to amplify business cycle fluctuations and cause or exacerbate financial instability,”  according to the 
Committee on the Global Financial System (2010a, p. 8). 
2 “The term ‘macroprudential’ refers to the use of prudential tools with the explicit objective of promoting the 
stability of the financial system as a whole, not necessarily of the individual institutions within it” (Piet Clement, 
2010, p.65). 
3 The FSC serves as a consolidated policy-making body. The FSS primarily examines and supervises financial 
institutions. The FSS was established in 1999 by bringing together four supervisory bodies.  
4 This paper defines mortgage loans as banks’ household loans for housing purchases and other uses, secured by 
mortgages on residential properties. 
5 Direct measures are those that directly regulate the terms and conditions of mortgage lending. Thus, the available 
amount of the loan for a borrower can be limited according to the criteria of the regulation.   
6 The LTV ratio is defined as the ratio of a possible loan amount against the value of collateral. “It is a key indicator 
of the ability of the mortgage market to provide access to financing” (Jones and Yokoyama, 2008, p.17). 
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Figure 1. Korea’s Housing Purchase Price Composite Index, 1993:1–2010:8  
 
                         Source: Kook Min Bank. 
This paper also discusses relevant policy implications for policy makers working to put in place 
macroprudential policies designed to increase the stability and resilience of the financial system 
as a whole.   
In December 2009, the Basel Committee introduced a number of macroprudential elements into 
the capital framework to help contain systemic risks (BCBS, 2009). The Committee on the 
Global Financial System (CGFS) recently assessed macroprudential policy, including the tools 
for property lending (GCFS, 2010b). Still, concerns remain about choosing the appropriate 
instruments to deal with financial system risks.  
In Korea, macroprudential supervision7 was in its infancy when the FSS began to use regulatory 
LTV ratios for mortgage loans around 2003 (Kim, 2006). Korea incorporated the ideas of 
macroprudential supervision into its prudential oversight framework, despite the newness of the 
concept, because of the lessons it learned from the collapse of the credit card bubble, according 
to Lee (2006).  This paper offers examples of what can realistically be done with, and expected 
from, macroprudential regulations. 
The rest of this paper8 is organized as follows. The next section provides background on the 
increase of mortgage loans in Korea. The third section describes macroprudential policy in Korea 
and explains the experience with a countercyclical approach to mortgage lending, focusing on 
the application of a series of regulatory LTV adjustments. Applications of regulatory debt-to-
income (DTI) ratio and other restrictions are presented in Appendixes A and B. The fourth 
section explores the policy implications from a perspective of cyclicality in banking and 
macroprudential supervision.  The fifth and final section concludes.   
                                                        
7  “Macroprudential supervision is aimed at protecting the financial system from macroeconomic shocks and 
preventing financial distresses from spilling over to the real economy,” according to Lee (2006, p. 2).  
8 Unless otherwise stated, the factual details regarding the Korean prudential measures presented in this paper were 
obtained from guidelines, press releases and periodicals (Annual Report) of the FSS.  
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2. Background on the Growth of Mortgage Loans  
 
2.1. Strong Housing Markets 
 
Compared to other cities in Korea, housing prices in the Seoul metropolitan area have been high. 
Housing prices, including those in Seoul, dropped precipitously after the Asian financial crisis of 
1997.  By 2000, housing prices had recovered somewhat.   
 
Prices began to increase steadily in 2001.  There was widespread worry that the price rise for 
properties in the southern areas of Seoul, with their well-planned urban infrastructure and good 
schools, could cause a real estate bubble.  Furthermore, possible ripple effects from such a real 
estate bubble increased government concerns about the growing gap in income (Jones and 
Yokoyama, 2008). 
 
In August 2005, the government began to set up new real estate policy packages to steady 
volatile housing costs. The packages were aimed at increasing the supply of housing, lowering 
housing prices, and restructuring the Korean property tax system. This last measure was intended 
to curb speculative demand by increasing the tax burden on high-priced houses and on owners of 
multiple houses (Jones and Yokoyama, 2008). 
 
At that time, the supervisory authority’s prudential measure for mortgage lending was also 
included and considered one of the important measures to be used to reduce demand for housing.  
 
2.2. Deregulation in Housing Finance9 
 
Housing finance in Korea can be separated into two eras: pre-deregulation and post-deregulation. 
Before housing finance was deregulated in 1996, over four-fifths of the housing finance market 
was public.  
 
These loans were provided by the National Housing Fund (NHF). Lower-income households 
were thus able to receive rates below the going market rate. The Korea Housing Bank (KHB), in 
turn, provided housing loans to those with higher incomes. 
 
In 1996, the Korean housing market structure was changed drastically: commercial banks 
entered into the long-term mortgage business. This followed in 1997 by the privatization of KHB.  
The Asian crisis of 1998 rocked the finance industry and spurred Korea to relax the 
governmental control over the housing market. A major element in this change was removing the 
mandatory sub-market housing prices in February 1998.  
 
In 2004, these changes were continued with the establishment of the Korean Housing Finance 
Corporation (KHFC), which purchases long-term mortgages from commercial banks. This 
increased both the available liquidity and the length of maturity for mortgage loans. 
 
                                                        
9  The factual details presented in this section were obtained from “Determinants of house prices in nine Asia-Pacific 
economies” by Glindro and others (2008, p. 27-28). 
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2.3. Monetary Policy Response to Rising Housing Prices10  
 
Some advocated countering the rapid rise in housing prices through the use of monetary policy. 
The argument that the policy rate should be increased was more appealing to the public, 
particularly when housing prices began to rise again after February 2003.   
 
The Bank of Korea (BoK) argued that expansionary monetary and fiscal policies should be used 
in a positive manner to deal with the economic downturn. In addition, the BoK believed that the 
government should deal with the rapid increase of housing prices by lessening the imbalance 
between the housing supply and demand and weakening the speculative motive in the housing 
market.  Accordingly, the BoK lowered its policy rate twice in 2003.   
 
Later, this expansionary policy changed. The BoK increased its policy rate beginning in the 
fourth quarter of 2005. This increase was made to moderate the side-effects generated by the 
continually low interest rate and to deal preemptively with the expected upward pressures on 
prices. Prices remained generally stable, but there were latent upward pressures on prices 
generated by the economic recovery and higher oil prices. Additionally, the BoK increased the 
policy rate to 5.25 percent in August 2008 because the bank judged that the upward trend in 
prices could stimulate inflation expectations. 
 
In early 2009, while the world economy continued its downturn and domestic demand and 
exports contracted sharply, the central bank lowered its policy rate by 0.5 percentage points, 
bringing the policy rate down to its lowest-ever level of 2.0 percent. These cuts followed the 
bank’s reduction of the policy rate in 2008, totaling 2.25 percentage points, after Lehman 
Brothers filed for bankruptcy in September (Figure 2).  
 
Figure 2. Apartment Purchase Price Index in Seoul, and BoK Policy Rate, 2001:1–2010:1 
      
         Source:  BoK, Kook Min Bank.  
Note: Policy rate is the overnight call rate target. The policy rate has been changed from overnight call rate to ‘the Bank 
of Korea Base Rate’ since March 2008 (BoK).
                                                        
10  The factual details presented in this section were obtained from the Monetary Policy Report (MPR) published 
annually (2001–10) by the BoK. 
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2.4. Preference for Mortgage Loans 
 
Banks favor mortgage loans because they are generally less risky and more profitable than 
corporate lending.  For several years in the mid-2000s, excessive competition between 
commercial banks led to a high concentration in mortgage loans. In addition, households 
increased their demand for housing loans in anticipation of rising asset prices and a continuation 
of low interest rates (MPR, 2002). 
 
Another reason for the rapid increase in mortgage lending was the growth of installment 
financing. Previously, consumers would first accumulate a substantial sum by setting aside 
regular installments with which to purchase a house. More recently, it has become increasingly 
common to purchase a house by taking out a loan and then paying off the principal and interest 
over a long period through installments (MPR, 2002). 
 
As of July 2010, the amount of outstanding housing mortgage loans extended by banks stood at 
275.4 trillion won (Figure 3), and the share of mortgage loans in banks' household lending was 
65.4 percent (420.4 trillion won). Mortgage loans held by non-bank financing corporations stood 
at 69 trillion won.11 
 
Despite the continuous increase of household debt, driven by mortgage loan growth, the 
likelihood of a large-scale default on household debt does not appear large (MPR, 2005).  Banks’ 
delinquency rate on mortgage loans was 0.45 percent at the end of August 2009.  This is far 
below the delinquency rates for household credit loans (1.05 percent) or loans to small and 
medium enterprises (SMEs) (2.18 percent).12   
 
Figure 3. Trend of Mortgage Loans of Banks in Korea, 2003:10–2010:8 
 
 
                  Source: BoK. 
                                                        
11  BoK Press Release, September 2010. “Household Loans by Depository Corporations during July 2010.” Non-
bank financial corporation refers to mutual savings banks, credit cooperatives, community credit cooperatives, 
mutual credits, trust companies, and postal savings. 
12  Financial Stability Report (FSR), BoK, November 2009. 
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3. Macroprudential Policy in Korea 
 
3.1. Emergence of Macroprudential Supervision  
 
Macroeconomic instability greatly affected the financial crisis in Korea at the end of 1997. The 
need for macroprudential supervision in Korea was highlighted by the bursting of the credit card 
bubble in 2003.13   
 
During the credit card lending boom, the supervisory authority did not respond adequately to the 
growth of household delinquencies stemming from the reckless behavior of credit card issuers. 
The authority was not sensitive to systemic distress originating from households because its 
prudential oversight was primarily focused on the soundness of individual financial institutions 
(Lee, 2006). This case underlined the importance of placing greater emphasis on detecting early 
warning signs before the build-up of excessive imbalances continued for too long (Kang and Ma, 
2009). 
 
After the credit card bubble burst, there was a new, widespread appreciation of macroprudential 
policy. Mortgage loans had increased sharply since 2000, which undermined the stability of the 
overall housing market. The supervisory authority has taken steps to prevent overheating in 
mortgage lending and to minimize the risk of loan default.  
 
First, the supervisory authority raised the risk weighting for mortgage loans. The authority also 
raised the minimum loan loss reserve ratios for banks’ household and corporate loans that were 
classified14 as normal and precautionary in November 2002 and in December 2006.  
 
Second, in 2002, the authority started to reduce the maximum LTV ratio for mortgage loans, 
from approximately 75 percent to 40 percent in the Seoul metropolitan area.15  
 
The authority imposed additional measures, such as a ceiling of 40 percent on the DTI ratio for 
certain types of borrowers, as well as other restrictions on granting mortgage loans and maturity 
extensions on existing mortgage loans for properties in the Seoul metropolitan area. These 
various restrictions on mortgage lending were imposed on both banks and non-banking financial 
institutions. 
                                                        
13  “From mid-1998 to early 2002, the government pursued expansive economic policies to stimulate an economy 
struggling under the weight of a severe financial crisis. Credit card issuers began to compete fiercely for new card 
members in an attempt to expand their market share. What ensued from the perverse behavior were spiraling credit 
card delinquencies, which left the credit card companies with rapidly growing bad assets on their balance sheet. The 
distress in the credit card sector then quickly spread to other financial sectors. And with the economy in recession, 
many marginal companies and low-income households began to default on their debt.”  (Lee, 2006, p. 3).  
14 According to the FSS Handbook (2010): “Banks are required to appropriately classify their assets and ensure their 
soundness. Bank assets are classified into five categories: (i) normal; (ii) precautionary; (iii) substandard; (iv) 
doubtful; and (v) estimated loss. Under these asset classification standards, the definition of each asset classification 
reflects the debt-servicing ability of the borrowers. Banks are required to set aside loan loss reserves in excess of the 
minimum regulatory ratios.”   
15 The typical LTV ratio in OECD countries is generally much higher than in Korea and the guidelines on LTV 
ratios in other OECD countries limit the availability of loans by changing borrowing costs based on the LTV ratio 
(Jones and Yokoyama, 2008). 
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3.2. Countercyclical Approaches  
 
The financial supervisory authority’s effort began to slow the growth of mortgage lending, thus, 
preempting potential distress on the financial system from an overheated housing market in 2002 
(Figure 4).   
 
Figure 4. Apartment Purchase Price Index in Seoul, and Banks’ Mortgage Loans, 2004:10–2010:8 
 
                            Sources:  BoK, Koon Min Bank.  
 
3.2.1. Indirect Measures 
 
Risk weighting for mortgage loans 
 
Between 2001 and 2002, the risk weighting for mortgage loans related to capital requirement 
was raised from 50 percent to between 60 and 70 percent, with due consideration given to  
borrowers’ credit history and debt repayment ability.  
 
Minimum provisioning for household loans, including mortgage loans 
 
To help banks better contain a variety of credit risks, the FSS amended supervisory regulations 
regarding loan loss provisions.16 This was done by analyzing past loss rates and accordingly 
adjusting the minimum loan loss reserve ratios for household loans upward.   
 
In November 2002, the banks’ minimum loan loss reserve ratios for household loans classified as 
both normal and precautionary were pushed up from 0.5 percent to 0.75 percent and from 2 
percent to 8 percent, respectively. For loans classified as doubtful, the provisioning ratio was 
raised from 50 percent to 55 percent (Table 1).   
 
In December 2006, the minimum loan loss reserve ratios for household loans classified as both 
normal and precautionary were further raised from 0.75 to 1.0 percent and from 8 to 10.0 percent, 
respectively.  Additionally, provisioning requirements were expanded to cover all unused credit 
commitments (Table 1).  
 
                                                        
16  “Under the loan loss provisioning scheme, banks set aside less money for losses during economic upturns when 
the credit risk of borrowers is low and banks set aside more money during economic downturns when the borrower 
credit risk is higher” (FSR, April 2010, p. 87). 
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Table1. Adjusted Minimum Loan Loss Reserve Ratios for Banks, 2010 (percent) 
 
       Source:  FSS. 
 
3.2.2. Direct Approach Focused on Regulatory LTV Ratio 
 
The supervisory authority determined that two of the major reasons for the surge in mortgage 
lending were the collateral-focused lending practices of financial companies and the willingness 
of households to take on mortgage debt beyond their ability to repay it, to take advantage of 
rising housing prices. In addition, the indirect approaches described above were thought to be 
insufficient to deal with the banks’ rapidly growing housing loans. Thus the FSS chose the LTV 
ratio17 as the main policy instrument to constrain the growth of mortgage loans starting in 2002.  
 
Calculating the LTV ratio 
 
The amount of a housing mortgage loan18 is calculated by using the regulatory LTV ratio. The 
regulatory LTV ratio is the ratio of the maximum amount of a possible loan against the value of 
its collateral for each loan account (Box 1).   
 
In principle, when calculating the value of security, a bank will use one of the four categories of 
evaluation data prepared by highly credible evaluation agencies. 
 
Box1. Calculation of the Regulatory LTV Ratio 
 
  The amount of housing mortgage loan + senior loansa + leasehold depositb  
                     The collateral value (value of security)                                              X 100  
 
Source:  FSS   
a. Senior loans have the right to be paid before other loans at the time of disposal of securities. 
b. Leasehold deposits of a lessee fulfilling requisites for counteraction. The paid deposit from the 
Chonsei contract19 is included. Additionally, in cases where there are rooms with no leasehold, 
the expected leasehold deposits of small amounts should be calculated and included in the 
leasehold deposit. 
 
                                                        
17  These requirements for LTV ratios were integrated into the July 2007 regulations. 
18  In cases where any financial institutions is deemed to extend a credit loan for the purpose of avoiding the 
application of loan-to-value of a housing mortgage loan, the amount of that credit loan shall be added to the amount 
of housing loan.   
19  “Chonsei is a unique rental contract in the Korean housing market, in which the tenant pays an upfront deposit in 
the beginning of the contract period with no requirement for paying the monthly rent. The deposit is fully refundable 
at the end of the contract period” (Glindro and others, 2008, p.27). 
Classification 
Household Loans  Corporate Loans  Credit card receivables 
Until 
2002.11 
2002.12– 
2006.11 
2006.12
and after 
Until
2006.11 
2006.12–
2007.11 
2007.12
and after 
Until 
2002.11 
2002.12– 
2006.11 
2006.12
and after 
Normal  0.5  0.75  1.0  0.5  0.7  0.85   0.5  1.0  1.5 
Precautionary  2.0  8.0  10.0  2.0  7.0  2.0  10.0  15.0 
Substandard  20  20  20 
Doubtful  50  55  50  50  60 
Presumed loss  100  100  100 
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Lowering the LTV ratio in 2002 and 2003 
 
In September 2002, the FSS required banks to lower the LTV ratio on mortgage loans to below 
60 percent of the value of the borrower-pledged real property from the prevailing 70 percent to 
80 percent. In June 2003, the LTV ratio was lowered from 60 to 50 percent for loans with 
maturity of 3 years or less and backed by real properties located in speculative areas (Table 2). 
 
Table 2. LTV Ratios, June 2003 
 
  Speculation Zone
a  Overheated Speculation Districtb  Other Areas 
Housec  Apartment  Housec Apartment  Housec  Apartment 
Not more than 3 years  50% or less  50% or less  50% or less  50% or less  60% or less  60% or less 
More than 3 years  60% or less  60% or less  60% or less  60% or less  60% or less  60% or less 
       Source:  FSS. 
a. An area designated by the Minister of Strategy and Finance pursuant to the Article 104-2 of the Income Tax Act. 
  b. An area designated by the Minister of Land, Transport and Maritime Affairs or the Mayor/Provincial Governor pursuant to 
the provisions of Article 41 of the Housing Act. 
c. Refers to houses excluding apartments and apartments for commercial and residential purposes. 
 
In October 2003, the LTV ratio for loans with 10 years or less maturity and backed by apartment 
units in speculative areas was further reduced from 50 percent to 40 percent (Table 3).  
 
Table 3. LTV Ratios, October 2003 
 
  Speculation Zone  Overheated Speculation District  Other Areas 
House  Apartment House  Apartment  House  Apartment
Not more than 3 years  50% or less 40% or less 50% or less  50% or less  60% or less  60% or less
More than 3 yrs but not more than 10 yrs  60% or less 40% or less 60% or less  60% or less  60% or less  60% or less
More than 10 yrs  60% or less 60% or less 60% or less  60% or less  60% or less  60% or less
 
      Source:  FSS. 
 
Adjusting the LTV ratio upward in 2004 
 
In 2003, government intervention, including the prudential measures, successfully resulted in the 
slowing of the growth in housing prices. As a consequence, there were fewer loan defaults and 
the growth of new loans was slowed. In March 2004, the FSS raised the LTV ratio from 60 
percent to 70 percent for mortgage loans not generally used for speculative purposes: those with 
a maturity of 10 years or more and less than one year of interest-only payments (Table 4). This 
step aimed to promote longer maturity by addressing the short-term maturity structure of 
mortgage loans. The FSS did this to address concerns that excessively low LTV ratios were 
unfair to both borrowers and non-speculative homebuyers. 
 
Table 4. LTV Ratios, March 2004 
 
  Speculation Zone 
Overheated Speculation 
District  Other Areas 
House  Apartment  House  Apartment  House  Apartment
Not more than 3 years  50% or less 40% or less  50% or less 50% or less  60% or less  60% or less
More than 3 yrs but not more than 10 yrs  60% or less 40% or less  60% or less 60% or less  60% or less  60% or less
More than 10 yrs  60% or less 60% or less  60% or less 60% or less  60% or less  60% or less
Payment in installments (10 yrs or more)a  70% or less 70% or less  70% or less 70% or less  70% or less  70% or less
    Source:  FSS. 
   a. Refers to loans with fixed interest rates (and a grace period of one year or less, DTI of 40% or less), having a plan to sell the 
loan to the Korea Housing Finance Corporation or a plan for self-securitization. 
11 
 
 
Lowering the LTV ratio in 2005 and 2006 
 
Mortgage loans continued to grow in 2005 (Figure 5).   
 
Figure 5. Apartment Purchase Price Index in Seoul, and Banks’ Mortgage Loans, 2004:10–2007:1 
 
                  Source:  BoK, Koon Min Bank. 
 
 
In June 2005, the LTV ratio for apartment units priced more than KRW600 million (about 
US$600,000) in speculative areas was lowered from 60 to 40 percent.   
 
The LTV ratio for mortgage borrowers who regularly paid both the principal and the interest on 
loans with more than 10 years maturity was left unchanged. At that time, borrowers with long 
maturity mortgage loans were not considered speculative housing buyers.  
 
In September 2006, the FSS announced additional measures amid a continuing surge in housing 
prices. All mortgage borrowers seeking an apartment unit priced more than KRW600 million in 
speculative areas became subject to the 40 percent LTV ratio (Table 5). Previously, mortgage 
borrowers whose loan maturity was more than 10 years had been only subjected to a 60 percent 
LTV. 
 
Table 5. LTV Ratios, September 2006 
 
  Source:  FSS. 
 a. Refers to loans with fixed interest rates (and a grace period of one year or less, DTI of 40% or less), having a plan to sell the 
loan to the Korea Housing Finance Corporation or a plan for self-securitization. 
  Speculation Zone 
Overheated Speculation 
District
Other Areas 
House  Apartment House  Apartment  House  Apartment
Not more than 3 years  50% or less 40% or less 50% or less 50% or less  60% or less  60% or less
More than 3 yrs but not more than 10 yrs  60% or less 40% or less 60% or less 60% or less  60% or less  60% or less
More 
than 10yrs 
Collateral 
value 
More than 600 Mil won  60% or less 40% or less 60% or less 60% or less  60% or less  60% or less
600 Mil won or less  60% or less 60% or less 60% or less 60% or less  60% or less  60% or less
Payment in installments(10 yrs or more)a  70% or less 70% or less 70% or less 70% or less  70% or less  70% or less
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Integrating the measures into the regulations on supervision in July 2007 
 
The supervisory authority has made numerous announcements regarding measures for risk 
management of housing mortgage loans since 2002. In actuality, the announced measures were 
treated as requirements. However, the structure of the administrative guidelines did not support 
either a stronger administrative power or a strong legal basis for implementation.   
 
In July 2007, a series of measures to strengthen the risk management of mortgage lending were 
rearranged into the Regulation 20  and the Detailed Regulation 21  on Supervision of Banking 
Business (Box 2). The measures that applied to non-banking financial institutions were also 
written in during the same time.22  The official integration of the measures sent a signal that these 
measures would not easily be weakened within a short period of time.    
 
The Regulation contains a section entitled “Standards for Risk Management of Housing 
Mortgage Loan” (see Appendix C). The separate Detailed Regulation contains a section entitled 
“Detailed Standards for Risk Management of Housing Mortgage Loan.” 23 
 
Box 2. Excerpt from the Regulation on Supervision of Banking Businessa 
 
The regulation on risk management on housing mortgage loans reads as follows: 
 Article 29‐2  
 
(1)  A financial institution, when dealing with housing mortgage loans, shall abide by LTV (Loan‐to‐Value ratio), DTI (Debt‐
to‐Income ratio) and other restrictions, etc. on granting housing mortgage loans and extensions of maturity provided for in 
Appendix 6  in order to maintain the sound management pursuant to Article 45 of the Act. 
 
(2)    In  cases  where  the  Governor  deems  it  urgently  necessary  in  view  of  the  management  soundness  of  financial 
institutions,  the Governor may adjust LTV and DTI provided  for  in Appendix 6 within  the  limit of adding or  reducing 10 
percentage points. In such cases, the Governor shall immediately report the details of such adjustment to the FSC (Financial 
Services Commission). 
 
(3)  The detailed criteria on calculation methods and applicable objects of the LTV and DTI provided for in Paragraph (1), 
and the details of handling housing mortgage loans and limitations on extending maturity shall be subject to the 
determination of the Governor. 
  
Source: FSS, Regulation on Supervision of Banking Business. 
a. The regulation of Risk Management on Housing Mortgage Loans was newly established on July 26, 2007. 
 
                                                        
20  “The purpose of the Regulation is to prescribe matters necessary for the enforcement of matters within the 
jurisdiction of the Financial Services Commission in relation to the supervision of financial institutions pursuant to 
the Banking Act and the Enforcement Decree thereof, and other relevant Acts and subordinate statutes”  (FSS, 
Regulation on Supervision of Banking Business). 
21  “The purpose of the Detailed Regulations is to prescribe matters relating to the enforcement of those under the 
jurisdiction of the Governor of the Financial Supervisory Service provided for in the Banking Act and the 
Enforcement Decree of the Banking Act, and other relevant Acts and subordinate statutes, or regulations established 
by the Financial Services Commission, such as the Regulations on Supervision of Banking Business” (FSS, Detailed 
Regulation on Supervision of Banking Business). 
22  Those measures consisted of the Regulation (and Detailed Regulation) on Supervision of Insurance Business, the 
Regulation (and Detailed Regulation) on Supervision of Mutual Savings Bank Business; the Regulation (and 
Detailed Regulation) on Supervision of Mutual Financial Business; and the Regulation (and Detailed Regulation) on 
Supervision of Credit-Specialized Financial Business.   
23 Available on the FSS website at “Detailed Regulation on Supervision of Banking Business <Appendix 18>”, 
<<http://english.fss.or.kr/fsseng/emdc/prs/fss_v.jsp?btmIndex=174&fssIndex=10090&selectType=0&find=>>. 
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Easing the mortgage servicing burden in November 2008 
 
Through 2008, housing prices continued to rise, but at a constrained rate. Due to the massive 
worldwide economic crisis, the FSS provided temporary relief to household borrowers to address 
their concerns about falling housing prices and their deteriorating ability to serve household 
mortgage debt.   
 
In November 2008, the government and the financial supervisory authority took a number of 
separate actions to provide relief to household borrowers. First, certain residential areas in 
southern Seoul were no longer designated as "speculative." This significantly reduced the debt 
burden of many mortgage borrowers, and in turn eased the LTV and DTI regulations imposed in 
these areas. 
 
Second, an exemption was given to qualified borrowers who took out a second mortgage loan, 
which meant that they did not have to sell their first house.24  Borrowers were considered 
qualified if the location of the second house was recategorized as no longer in a speculative area.   
 
Additionally, temporary relief was provided in the form of extension of maturities, rescheduled 
loan payments, and extension of the interest-only period for consumer loans. 
 
 
Strengthening risk management for the previously lifted speculative areas in July 2009 
 
In 2009, the expectations of rising house prices, along with other factors, such as the November 
2008 easing of real estate regulations,25 caused an increase in mortgage loans (Figure 6). 
  
Figure 6. Apartment Purchase Price Index in Seoul, and Banks’ Mortgage Loans, 2007:1–2010:8 
 
 
             Source:  BoK, Koon Min Bank.  
                                                        
24 This exemption is related to the regulation that states, “A financial institution may not newly extend a loan for a 
borrower who has already secured a housing mortgage loan against an apartment in a speculation zone” (FSS, 2007). 
25  As part of its “Comprehensive Policy Measures to Overcome the Ongoing Economic Difficulties,” the 
government revoked the designations of “Overheated Speculation Zones” and “Speculation-Prone Zones” in all 
regions, with the exception of three districts in Seoul. 
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In July 2009, the FSS asked banks to voluntarily strengthen their mortgage loan risk 
management. In October 2009, the request was extended to non-banking financial companies.26  
 
The recommendations called for lowering the LTV and raising the DTI ratios for properties in 
certain zones of the Seoul metropolitan area, which were no longer classified as overheated 
speculative districts or speculative designation zones.27  At that time, there were only three 
speculative districts in Seoul where the LTV ratio requirement remained at 40 percent.   
 
As a result of these changes, the LTV limit was lowered from 60 percent to 50 percent in the 
following cases (Table 6):  
 
 For apartment units with mortgage maturities of less than 10 years. 
 
 For apartment units with mortgage maturities of more than 10 years but with a collateral 
value over KRW600 million. 
 
 For non-apartment, detached units with mortgage maturities of less than 3 years. 
 
Table 6. Change in the LTV Ratio for Banks in the Seoul Metropolitan Area, 2009 
 
 
       Source:  FSS Press Release, July 2009. 
      a. Refers to loans with fixed interest rates (and a grace period of one year or less, DTI of 40% or less), having a plan to sell 
the  loan to the Korea Housing Finance Corporation or a plan for self-securitization. 
 
The strengthened LTV and DTI regulations have subdued the upward trend of housing prices.  
Since early 2010, despite signs of economic recovery, several restraining factors have held this 
rising trend in check. These factors include anxiety about overvaluation of housing prices and the 
amount of unsold housing (FSR, April 2010).   
 
This series of prudential measures seem to have generally protected the quality of loans. This is 
evaluated by using the average LTV ratio as an indicator of banks’ mortgage loan quality. At the 
end of July 2009, the average LTV ratio was 47.1 percent, compared to 74.9 percent in the 
United States (FSR, November 2009).   
 
 
 
 
. 
                                                        
26  The currently applicable LTV ratio of 70 percent for non-banks (mutual finance companies, savings banks, and 
credit-specialized financial companies) was strengthened to 60 percent, starting in October 2009.  The currently 
applicable LTV ratio of 70 percent or less in regard to non-apartment detached units will remain in force unchanged. 
27  The strengthened LTV limit excluded mortgage loans that have a combined total of less than KRW50 million 
from all lenders, mortgage loans for relocation, and balloon payments and mortgage loans for unsold residential 
units. 
  Apartment units  Detached units 
  Before  After  Before  After 
 Not more than 3 years  60% or less  50% or less  60% or less  50% or less 
 3–10 yrs   60% or less  50% or less  60% or less  60% or less 
 More 
 than 10 yrs 
Collateral 
value  
 more than 600Mil won 60% or less  50% or less  60% or less  60% or less 
 600 Mil won or less  60% or less  60% or less  60% or less  60% or less 
 Payment in installments (10 yrs or more)a  70% or less  70% or less  70% or less  70% or less 
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4. Policy Implications  
 
Korea’s experience offers three lessons for macroprudential policy makers in other countries.  
 
First, direct measures regarding the LTV ratio, DTI ratio, and other restrictions on 
mortgage lending can be employed as an important part of a countercyclical framework, 
along with other credit cycle moderation instruments. 
 
The Committee on the Global Financial System has stated that LTV ratio caps at a certain level 
can contribute to enhancing financial system resilience and can moderate the financial cycle like 
automatic stabilizers.  It has also noted that the moderation effect can be enhanced when the caps 
are adjusted to their normal range in a countercyclical manner (CGFS, 2010b).   
 
This kind of discretionary intervention28 by the Korean authority has been working relatively 
well (Figure 7). The regulatory tools were deployed in a countercyclical way in the real economy.   
 
Figure 7. Average Annual Rate of Increase in Real House Prices, OECD Countries29 
 
              Source:  OECD Economic Outlook (average was calculated from the Economic Outlook database). 
 
Wezel (2010, p. 3) notes that, “Among the causes of procyclicality are backward-looking loan 
loss provisioning rules that do not recognize the build-up of credit risks in boom phases and thus 
facilitate credit expansion and excessive risk-taking. Procyclical lending and provisioning occur 
when a period of high credit growth and lax lending standards is followed by a downturn, which 
triggers a rise in non-performing loans and, hence, specific loan loss provisions.”   
 
Concerning countercyclical measures, Wezel also notes that dynamic loan loss provisioning can 
be one of the alternative tools to mitigate procyclicality since the basic idea of the tool is to build 
loan loss reserves during good times, which can then be used to absorb losses in bad times.30   
                                                        
28  The July 2007 regulation allows the Governor to adjust the LTV ratio and the DTI ratio within the range of 
adding or reducing 10 percentage points in cases where the Governor deems it urgently necessary in view of the 
management soundness of financial institutions without changing the regulation.  
29  The idea of Figure 7 comes from the IMF Seminar of Tao Sun and Prakash Loungani (2010). 
30  Wezel (2010, p. 3) explains that “Dynamic provisioning is one of the approaches recommended by the Financial 
Stability Forum (2009) to recognize and measure loan loss that incorporate a broader range of credit information. 
During an economic upswing, the stock of dynamic provisions grows rapidly as loan origination is high and loan 
losses are typically low. The reverse is true during economic downturns, and additional provisions for actual loan 
losses are then covered by drawing on the stock of dynamic provisions.” 
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However, Caprio (2010) shows that the method used in Spain and Colombia to vary provisions 
on a countercyclical basis demonstrated no ability to reign in or reduce an asset bubble. In Korea, 
the upward adjustments in provisioning requirements for mortgage loans were unsuccessful in 
limiting the expanding housing loans in times of the housing boom because the provisions were 
not designed to cover extreme events.   
As mortgage lending continued to increase rapidly during the boom cycle, the ratio of loans 
classified as substandard or below (SBL ratio) to total outstanding loans fell from 1.22 to 0.84 
percent in December 2006, the lowest level to that date (Table 7).  
Table 7. Bank SBL Ratio 
(Percent, end of period) 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
SBL ratio 12.9 8.0 3.41 2.33 2.63 1.90 1.22 0.84 0.72 1.14 
         Source:  FSS. 
Even though the mortgage loans seemed to be healthy, prudential measures for them were 
strengthened because of an increase in the proportion of mortgage loan to total credit, as well as 
the exposure to interest rate risk and falling collateral values (Lee, 2006).  
Regarding monetary policy and macroprudential policy, Blanchard, Dell’Ariccia, and Mauro 
(2010) suggest that policy makers use regulatory tools, rather than the policy rate, to deal with 
excess leverage, excessive risk-taking, and apparent deviations of asset prices from fundamentals.  
Regulatory tools such as the LTV and DTI ratios are more likely than the policy rate to have the 
desired impact on the targeted variables (Figure 8).   
Most central bankers tend to be cautious regarding the use of monetary policy to counter rises in 
the price of assets because it is hard to tell whether the rise results from the formation of a bubble 
or from an improvement in fundamental economic conditions (MPR, during 2003). 
Figure 8. Trend of LTV Ratio Capa for Apartment Units in Seoul, and BoK Policy Rate  
 
                  Sources: FSS, BoK. 
a. Less than three years maturity. 
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The Basel Committee recently suggested that authorities deploy a countercyclical capital buffer, 
possibly in tandem with other macroprudential tools, in order to ensure that the banking system 
had an additional buffer of capital to protect it from future potential losses when excess 
aggregate credit growth is judged to be associated with a buildup of systemwide risks. 31   
The Committee also suggested that alternative tools, such as LTV limits, interest rate 
qualification tests, and sectoral capital buffers, be deployed in situations where excess credit 
growth is concentrated in specific sectors, but aggregate credit growth is judged not to be 
excessive or accompanied by increased systemwide risk.   
Still, the buffer alone is not sufficient. Therefore, the authorities in each jurisdiction must use 
wide discretionary power to make concrete decisions on macroprudential policies and tools.32 
The second lesson for macroprudential policy makers is that measures need to be applied 
in a timely manner and according to the specific conditions of each given country.   
Policy makers should examine and diagnose the country’s housing and mortgage lending market, 
including the government’s housing policy, as it may affect the supply of housing. Supervisors’ 
responses should adapt to changing economic conditions, including the response of the credit and 
housing markets. Regulatory measures need to be reviewed in response to fluctuations in the 
financial cycle.33 In general, the fluctuations can be measured or evaluated by the increasing rate 
of credit or the amount of loans supplied for a certain period. 
The rapid growth of the mortgage loans was not expected when the Korean government relaxed 
its controls over the housing market and finances after the Asian crisis. Therefore, it seems 
necessary to examine possible effects on the markets when an authority deregulates a prudential 
regime.   
Stress tests also need to be conducted to check systemic weaknesses and risks. Since 2006, the 
FSS has conducted a series of stress tests on the likely impact of a sharp drop in real estate prices.  
The authority focused on the banking system’s exposure to mortgage lending and analyzed the 
effect of falling housing prices on bank profitability (Lee, 2006). Banks were also required to 
regularly conduct similar tests.  
An effective collateral evaluation system and an income certification method are indispensable to 
banks in order to efficiently identify the risks in the financial environment.   
                                                        
31  “The Basel Committee agreed that a building block approach should be adopted to organize the work on 
procyclicality. The aim of this approach was to align the development of tools to address procyclicality according to 
a specific set of objectives” (Countercyclical capital buffer proposal, BCBS, July 2010, p.1). 
32 N’Diaye (2009, p.21) notes that “countercyclical macro prudential rules, such as countercyclical capital adequacy 
rules, could support monetary policy in reducing output fluctuations while maintaining financial stability. The 
simulations also show that countercyclical capital adequacy rules can help mitigate swings in asset prices and, 
potentially, lower the risks of financial instability. Nevertheless, implementing and appropriately calibrating 
countercyclical macro prudential rules to individual country circumstances may be complex, particularly in cases 
where banks already exceed the existing capital adequacy requirements.” 
33 There is a possibility that economic cycle is not consistent with the financial cycle.  
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The Korean measures have been strengthened in response to both the housing market condition 
and mortgage loan trends. In particular, the measures were especially focused on borrowers of 
large loans, as well as on the speculative areas (where apartment prices shot up at an abnormal 
pace and the demand for housing loans was simultaneously severely concentrated).   
In the speculative areas, the LTV ratio was lowered to 40 percent (Figure 9). The application of 
the DTI ratio was extended to mortgage applicants who purchased a housing unit in a speculative 
area with collateral value over KRW 600 million. 
Figure 9: Trend of LTV Ratio Capa for Apartment Units in Seoul, and 
 Apartment Purchase Price Index of Seoul  
 
                   Sources:  FSS, Kook Min Bank. 
a. Less than three years maturity. 
The speculative areas were designated by the government, mainly on the basis of the increasing 
rate of housing prices and other considerations. Thus, in November 2008, when the government 
abolished the designation, the mortgage lending criteria of those particular areas were 
automatically lowered. As a result, housing prices were expected to rise and mortgage lending 
was expected to increase again.    
Other restrictions on granting mortgage loans and maturity extensions were implemented for 
certain cases. For example, one regulation incorporated loans for borrowers who had already 
secured a housing mortgage loan against an apartment in a speculative zone. These restrictions 
were successfully executed by banks and non-banking financial companies with the help of the 
credit information sharing system of the Korea Federation of Banks (KFB). 34      
                                                        
34  The Korea Federation Banks (KFB) serves as the public credit information registry under the applicable Korean 
law. It’s credit information sharing system has broad data coverage, including outstanding loans (dates, amounts, 
and names of lending institutions, mortgage collateral); encompasses every financial institution in Korea; and helps 
them perform efficient credit assessment of their customers as well as strengthen the monitoring of borrowers. KFB 
pools the credit information of individual consumers and corporations from banks and non-banking financial 
companies in Korea. (KFB) (http://www.kfb.or.kr/kfb_eng_09/functions/functions01.htm).     
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One requirement related to small and medium enterprises (SMEs) is particularly notable. It 
requires that no financial institution should grant a new corporate loan for small and medium 
enterprises secured by mortgage on an apartment in a speculation zone for the purpose of 
acquiring a residential house. This was announced in response to fierce competition among 
domestic banks to expand the scale of their assets in the wake of a real estate market boom. This 
was also intended to prevent SME loans from being used for speculative investing in the housing 
markets.     
In 2007, the FSS announced proposals for systemwide improvement of mortgage loan reviews 
with the KFB and the banking industry, in order to shift loan review practices from being 
focused on collateral to being based on an assessment of ability to repay debt. The proposal 
encouraged lenders to improve their internal loan review processes based on best practices.    
The third and last lesson is that it is advisable for supervisors to preemptively prepare 
macroprudential instruments before banks enter a period of rapid mortgage lending. This 
would avoid reckless mortgage lending operations and weaken any speculative motive in the 
housing market.   
It was a tremendous challenge for the Korean authority to strengthen the standards needed to 
counteract rapidly growing mortgage lending and to slow run-ups in housing prices.  Despite the 
fact that many of the borrowers lodged protests against policies that reduced access to credit for 
some people, prudential measures for mortgage lending have been recognized as an important 
instrument for reducing housing demand.35  
In fact, the rapid increase of housing prices was (and is) one of the main national issues, as it 
affects the distribution of wealth. Announcements of prudential measures have generated 
considerable criticism and a debate about the role of the financial authority. Some academics 
commented that the banking regulation had temporary and limited effects in restraining the 
demand for loans, and such regulations cannot be the essential remedy for the housing bubble. 
Newspapers commented that the measures were disadvantageous for the poor because some 
lower-income borrowers could find it harder to access credit to buy their houses in a boom phase.   
By contrast, others pointed out that the measures should be toughened further because bank 
lending was continuously increasing after a brief slow down. Having experienced the housing 
boom and the recent crisis, most financial institutions and borrowers have gradually begun to 
understand the necessity for regulations on the mortgage market. 
Although the quality of mortgage loans has remained generally sound, household debt has been 
rising faster than income because of mortgage loans for some time. Thus, the accumulation of 
household debt should be watched because it could weaken potential growth by reducing saving 
rates, thereby decreasing future capacity to consume (MPR, March 2010). 
                                                        
35  When a downward spiral of housing prices continues, the construction sector or house suppliers tend to want the 
authority to weaken the measures so that banks can provide more loans to homebuyers in a bid to spur housing 
transactions.   
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5. Concluding Remarks 
“It is a challenge to sound the alarm when profits are going up during lending booms.” 
--- Taesoo Kang and Guonan Ma (2009) 
In good times, when businesses and banks enjoy large growth in profits, it can be daunting for 
policy makers to make decisions that may counteract that growth.  Similarly, during times when 
deregulation is popular, policy makers may be intimidated by going against public opinion and 
pushing new regulation.  
However, it is imperative to maintain a big picture perspective. Rampant asset growth in the 
banking sector, as well as in the nonbanking sector, can lead to unsustainable bubbles in the 
financial and real sectors of economy. Therefore, it is vital that financial supervisors ensure that 
credit stability is a priority over rapid growth in profits.  
Korea learned this lesson after suffering from both the Asian crisis of 1997 and the credit card 
collapse of 2003. The Korean financial supervisory authority was able to stabilize the overheated 
housing and mortgage lending markets by working jointly with the Korean government and the 
Bank of Korea.   
Many other countries are currently undergoing events in their housing markets similar to those 
experienced by Korea in the mid-2000s. These countries are seeing their mortgage lending 
starting to expand, along with the level of risk associated with these loans. Instituting 
countercyclical measures now, such as those used by Korea, will help prevent financial 
institutions from becoming insolvent. 
The applicability of Korea’s risk management scheme is not limited to mortgage loans. This 
concept is adaptable to other vulnerable sectors in the financial industry, such as credit loans and 
corporate loans. This method is most effective when paired with an early warning system to 
monitor the health of the financial industry. 
Lessons in macroprudential policy learned from Korea can hopefully help financial supervisors 
and policy makers from other countries avoid the repetition of a similar crisis in the future. 
 
21 
 
 
Appendix A. Mortgage Lending Policy: Regulatory DTI Ratio 
 
 
The regulatory debt-to-income (DTI) ratio is the total annual amount of redemption in principal 
and interest of the loan against the borrower’s annual income (Box A.1).  
 
Box A.1. Calculation of Debt-to-Income (DTI) Ratio 
 
             The redemption amount of principal per year for the relevant mortgage loan 
                         + the redemption amount of interest per year for other loans               X  100                         
                                                      Annual income 
         Source:  FSS. 
 
In addition to the applicable LTV ratio, the DTI ratio for some applicants has been limited since 
2005. In October 2005, the DTI ratio was limited to 40 percent for married borrowers whose 
spouse already had mortgage credit and for unmarried mortgage applicants 30 years or younger 
seeking housing units in speculative areas (Box A.2).  
 
In March 2006, the application of the DTI ratio was extended to include mortgage applicants 
purchasing a housing unit in a speculative area whose collateral value exceeded KRW600 
million, in addition to the LTV requirement already in effect.  
 
In November 2006, the application of the DTI ratio was expanded to include some additional 
speculative areas outside Seoul.  
 
Box A.2. Regulation on the DTI Ratioa 
 
In February 2007, the FSS announced proposals for systemic improvement of mortgage loan 
reviews with the Korea Federation of Banks and the banking industry, to shift loan review 
practices from being collateral-focused to being based on assessment of borrowers’ ability to 
repay debt. The proposal encouraged lenders to improve internal loan review processes through 
their own plan based on best practices.  
 
In March 2007, banks set forth detailed criteria to apply different lending limits to each borrower 
within a 40 percent to 60 percent DTI ratio, varying according to the size of the housing unit, 
lending amount, borrower's credit rating, repayment method, interest rate, and evidence of 
income.  
 
The 40 percent DTI regulation was set for a very limited range of cases:  
 
1. For loans secured by apartments in areas of high speculation as designed by the government or certain 
metropolitan areas designated as areas of excessive investment by the government, with appraisal values of 
more than KRW600 million where the loan application date is within 3 months of the ownership transfer; or  
 
2. For the following borrowers who:  
i) have a spouse who already has a loan secured by housing, or  
ii) are single and under 30 years old, applying for loans secured by apartment(s) located in areas of high 
speculation as designated by the government. 
 
 Source:  FSS 
a. Added to the regulation in July 2007.  
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In July 2007, the FSS released proposals (Best Practice) for systemic improvement of mortgage 
loan reviews for mutual savings banks, credit unions and credit cooperatives, and credit-
specialized financial companies. The scope of application for the financial institutions is loans 
for apartments within areas of high speculation as designated by the government, and areas of 
excessive investment in the Seoul metropolitan area.  DTI ratios of 40 percent to 60 percent are 
required for mortgage loans on apartments exceeding KRW300 million. The ratios are slightly 
higher for loans on apartments of lesser value (Table A.1). 
 
Table A.1. Best Practice DTI Ratios, July 2007  
Collateral value  Loan amount 
DTI base 
Banks, Insurers 
 Savings banks, mutual finance 
companies, credit specialized 
financial companies 
More than KRW 300mil.  
More than KRW100mil.  40%  Less than 
60%  (same) KRW50mil.–KRW100mil.  50% 
KRW50mil. or less  ‐ 
 KRW300 mil. 
or less 
 
Surface area more 
than 85m2 
More than KRW100mil.  40%  Less than 
60% 
45%  Less than 
70% KRW50mil.–KRW100mil.  50%  55% 
KRW50mil. or less  ‐  (same) 
Surface area less 
than 85m2 
More than KRW50mil.  50%, less than 60%  55%, less than 70%  
KRW50mil. or less  ‐  (same) 
Adjustments to DTI base 
Fixed interest  Amortization  Credit ratings  Income 
+ 5%p  + 5%p  ‐ 5%p or + 5%p   ‐ 5%p 
 
         Source:  FSS. 
 
In September 2009, the continued upward trend in the metropolitan area’s mortgage loans led the 
FSS to recommend that the banks apply the DTI ratio to cover some non-speculative areas 
(previously designated speculative) in the metropolitan area (Table A.2). 
 
Table A.2. DTI Ratios of Banks and Insurers, September 2009 
 
Collateral value  Loan amount 
DTI ratio 
Current coverage  Expanded coverage 
Speculative area  Seoul(excluding 
speculative area) 
Incheon, 
 Kyunggi 
More than KRW600 mil.   More than KRW50 mil.  40%  50%  60% 
KRW50 mil. or less  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
More than KRW 600 mil.  
(holding title for more than 3 
months) 
More than KRW100mil.  40% 
50%  60% 
KRW50 mil.–KRW100 mil.  50% 
KRW50 mil. or less  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
KRW300 mil.–KRW600 mil.   
 Surface area more than 85 m2 
More than KRW100 mil.  40% 
50%  60% 
KRW50 mil.–KRW100 mil.  50% 
KRW50 mil. or less  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
 Surface area less than 85 m2  More than KRW85 mil.  50%  50%  60% 
KRW50 mil. or less  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
         Source:  FSS Press Release, September 2009. 
         Note: Insurers were recommended with the same criteria in October 2009. 
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In October 2009, the FSS made recommendations to the non-banking financial companies36 to 
include applying debt to-income (DTI) ratios for all the metropolitan areas (Table A.3). 
 
TableA.3. DTI Ratios of Non-banks, October 2009 
Collateral value  Loan amount 
DTI ratio 
DTI 
adjustments 
  
Current coveragea  Expanded coverageb 
Speculative area Seoul (excluding 
speculative area)
Incheon, 
Kyunggi 
 More than KRW600 mil.  
(holding title for 3 months or 
less) 
More than KRW50 mil.  40%  50%  60% 
‐ 
KRW50 mil. or less  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
 More than KRW600 mil.  
(holding title for more than 3 
months) 
More than KRW100 mil.  40% 
50%  60%   Fixed interest 
rates : + 5%p
 
 Amortization 
schedule: + 
5%p 
 
 Credit 
ratings:         ‐ 
5%p or + 5%p
 
 Income: ‐ 
5%p 
 
KRW50 mil.–KRW100 mil.  50% 
KRW50 mil. or less  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
 KRW300 mil.– KRW600 mil.  More than KRW100 mil.  40% 
50%  60% 
KRW50 mil.–KRW100 mil.  50% 
KRW50 mil. or less  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
 KRW300 mil. or less   
 Surface area more than 85 
m2 
 
More than KRW100 mil.  45% 
55%  65% 
KRW50 mil.–KRW100 mil.  55% 
KRW50 mil. or less  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
 Surface area less than 85 m2  More than KRW50 mil.  55%  55%  65% 
KRW50 mil. or less  ‐  ‐  ‐ 
   Source:  FSS Press Release, October 2009.   
a. Supervisory regulation (in excess of KRW600 million, mortgage loans taken out less than 3 months subsequent to 
title transfer) and financial companies’ internal guidelines (other loans) 
b.  Maximum DTI ratio for apartments valued in excess of KRW300 million: 
   60% or less for Seoul  
   70% or less for Incheon and Kyunggi Province (currently 60% or less for speculative areas) 
    Maximum DTI ratio for apartments valued at KRW300 million or less: 
   70% or less for Seoul  
   75% or less for Incheon and Kyunggi Province (currently 70% or less for speculative areas) 
   
 
 
                                                        
36   Non-banking financial companies refer to mutual finance companies, savings banks and specialized credit 
financial companies. 
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Appendix B.  Other Oversight of Bank Lending Activities  
 
The following limitations were also issued by the financial supervisory authority. 
 
Limitations on Housing Mortgage Loans 
 
June 2005. A new home mortgage loan for purchase of an apartment unit in speculative areas 
will be allowed once for any single borrower. For those borrowers who ended up temporarily 
owning two housing units, mortgage credit for the new house in the speculative area will be 
allowed with the condition that the old housing unit be sold within a year of new mortgage date.  
 
August 2005. No new mortgage applications for the legally under-aged borrowers will be 
accepted. (Prior to this, there was no guidance on borrower’s age.)  For borrowers with three or 
more mortgages in speculative areas, mortgage loans will be reduced to two.  
 
January 2007. Rollover will be allowed for only one mortgage loan if a borrower has two or 
more mortgage loans backed by an apartment in a speculative area. The prohibition of multiple 
mortgage lending measures will be expanded to all financial sectors.  
 
Limitation on Corporate Loans based on Apartment in Speculation Zone 
 
June 2005. No financial institution should grant a new corporate loan secured by a mortgage on 
an apartment is to be acquired after July 2005 in a speculation zone, except with special approval.  
 
Response to the Herd Behavior in Bank Lending to SMEs 
 
To ensure the health of small and medium-size business loans, the financial authority stepped up 
its oversight on the credit evaluation methods used at banks to ensure that they are appropriate 
and watched over the use of loans to prevent funds from being used for purposes other than 
intended.  
 
Easing of Mortgage-Servicing Burden in 2008 
            
November 2008. Borrowers who took out a second mortgage on the condition of the sale of the 
first property within one year will be exempted from having to sell the first property if the area of 
the second property was no longer declared a "speculative" area.  
 
The exclusion coincided with the lifting of speculative designation of certain residential areas in 
southern Seoul by the government and significantly reduced the debt-servicing burden of many 
mortgage borrowers. Furthermore, borrowers who own two housing units and received financing 
on the condition that either of the units be sold within one year will be allowed to retain both 
housing units for up to two years.  
 
Additionally, financial institutions will be allowed to grant a new corporate loan secured by 
mortgage on an apartment in a speculation zone, unless the corporate loan is for the purpose of 
acquiring a residential house, except with special approval.  
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Appendix C. Standards for Risk Management of Housing Mortgage Loan 
 
CHAPTER I. General Provisions 
 
1. (Definitions) The terms used in these Standards shall be defined as follows: 
 
a. “Housing mortgage loan” means a loan for household (including an asset-backed securitized 
loan) extended by a financial institution against houses. The loan falling into any of the 
followings shall be deemed as housing mortgage loan unless otherwise prescribed:  
          (1) Intermediate payment loans and balance payment loans in case of parceling-out houses;  
          (2) Or relocation expense loans for houses under rebuilding and/or redevelopment, 
intermediate payment loans and balance payment loans for additional allotted charges.  
b. “House” means a house prescribed under Article 2, Item 1 of the Housing Act. 
c. “New loan” means a newly extended loan, including increase of the existing loan amount, 
renewal of the loan agreement, refinancing, taking over of obligations, etc. However, in 
cases of extension of loan maturity, renewal of the loan agreement or refinancing in which 
only the conditions for interest rate or maturity are changed and the transfer of the existing 
intermediate payment loan to a balance payment loan without increasing the amount of 
loan, they shall not be deemed to be new loans.  
d. “Loan-to-Value ratio (LTV)” means the ratio of maximum amount of possible loan against 
the value of mortgage, which is considered at the time of extending a housing mortgage 
loan. 
e. “Debt-to-Income ratio (DTI)” means the ratio of the total annual amount of redemption of 
principle and interest of the loan against the borrower’s annual income. 
f. “Speculation zone” means an area designated by the Minister of Strategy and Finance 
pursuant to the Article 104-2 of the Income Tax Act. 
g. “Overheated speculation district” means an area designated by the Minister of Land, 
Transport and Maritime Affairs or the Mayor/Do Governor pursuant to the provisions of 
Article 41 of the Housing Act. 
h. “Seoul Metropolitan Area” means Seoul Metropolitan City, Incheon Metropolitan City, 
and Gyeonggido. 
 
CHAPTER II. Loan-to-Value Ratio 
 
2. (Application of LTV) 
 
              a.     LTV at the time of extending new housing mortgage loans by financial institutions is as 
follows: 
          Note: (1)     Referring to the houses excluding apartments and apartments for commercial and residential purposes. 
     (2) In case of the intermediate payment loans and relocation expense loans for an apartment, the equivalent ratio 
shall be applied without taking the maturity into account. 
     (3) Referring to the loan with fixed interest rate (and with the grace period of one year or less, DTI of 40% or less), 
having a plan to sell itself to the Korea Housing Finance Corporation or a plan for self-securitization. 
     (4) In case of a house outside of the Seoul Metropolitan Area, for which a parceling-out contract was not 
 Speculation Zone Overheated Speculation District Other Areas 
Maturity House (1) Apartment House Apartment House Apartment 
Not more than 3 years (2) 50% or less 40% or less (2) 50% or less 50% or less (2) 60% or less (4) 60% or less (2) (4)
More than 3 yrs but not more than 10 yrs 60% or less 40% or less 60% or less 60% or less 60% or less (4) 60% or less (4) 
More 
than 10 yrs 
Mortgage value: 
more than 600 Mil won 60% or less 40% or less 60% or less 60% or less 60% or less 
(4) 60% or less (4) 
Mortgage value: 
less than 600 Mil won 60% or less 60% or less 60% or less 60% or less 60% or less 
(4) 60% or less (4) 
Payment in installments (10 yrs or more) (3) 70% or less 70% or less 70% or less 70% or less 70% or less 70% or less 
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concluded until June 10, 2008 after parceling-out procedures, if the house newly concludes a parceling-out 
contract between June 11, 2008 and June 30, 2009 and pay the contract deposit, the LTV of 70% or less applies. 
In such cases, the financial institution shall receive from the borrower a copy of the document issued by the 
Mayor or the head of Gun/Gu proving that the house has not been parceled-out and a copy of the document 
issued by the Mayor or the head of Gun/ Gu proving that there was a self-helping effort to parcel-out the house 
such as decreasing sales price by 10% or more or relaxation of parceling-out conditions whose effect is 
equivalent in its degree to the said decrease of sales price, and after checking the copy of the documents the 
financial institution shall calculate the LTV based on the decreased sales price (including the case of relaxation 
of parceling-out conditions). 
 
b. Despite the LTV prescribed in the above Sub-item (a), in case of taking over the loan of the 
existing borrower without changing balance amount, maturity, method of redemption and 
without extending additional loans, the LTV which was applied for the existing borrower 
may be applied for such taking over, and in case of transfer of the existing intermediate 
payment loan to a balance payment loan without increasing the amount of loan or change of 
the financial institution etc., the LTV at the time of extending the intermediate payment 
loan may be applied. 
 
CHAPTER III.  Debt-to-Income Ratio (DTI) 
 
3. (Applicable Objects and its Standards) In case a new housing mortgage loan falls under any of 
the followings, financial institutions shall extend the loan within the borrower’s DTI of not 
exceeding 40%: 
 
a. Apartment mortgage loan in a speculation zone for the borrower whose spouse has taken 
out a housing mortgage loan more than once: Provided, however, in case where the 
borrower inevitably takes over the loan obligations in order to inherit or to participate in 
auction procedures or others held to secure creditor’s debt obligations, the application of 
DTI may be exempted.  
b. Apartment mortgage loan in a speculation zone for an unmarried borrower who is less than 
full 30 years of age: Provided, however, in case where the borrower inevitably takes over 
the loan obligations in order to inherit or to participate in auction procedures or others held 
to secure creditor’s debt obligations, the application of DTI may be exempted. 
c. Household loan in order to finance a borrower who newly purchases an apartment as a 
mortgage, whose market price is more than 600 million won, in a speculation zone or in an 
overheated speculation district within Seoul Metropolitan Area: Provided, however, in case 
of any of the followings, the application of DTI may be exempted: 
(1) A loan against an apartment for which three months, as at the date of extending 
the loan, have passed from the date of registration of title transfer (referring to 
the date on which the application for title transfer is filed with the registry 
office): Provided, however, if the purpose of the loan is deemed to avoid 
application of DTI, it shall be excluded; 
(2) A loan against shares (proportional ownership) of the rebuilding or 
redevelopment for which three months have passed from the date of 
application for the change of association member list, or from the date of 
registration of proportional ownership transfer;  
(3) A loan against an apartment which falls under any of the followings and three 
months have not passed from the date of registration of title transfer: 
a) Small amount of loan covering 50 million won or less (aggregated 
amount of loans in all financial institutions); 
b) Loan exceeding 50 million won which is deemed to be inevitably 
necessary to finance urgent business needs or other purposes and 
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obtained approval of the Credit Committee (or, other decision-
making organization equivalent to the Credit Committee); or  
c) In case where the borrower inevitably takes over loan obligations in 
order to inherit or to participate in auction procedures or others held 
to secure creditor’s debt obligations; or 
(4) Loan for relocation expenses or additional allotted charges to be received as a 
result of the progress of rebuilding or redevelopment of houses after three 
months have passed since the acquisition of the houses.  
 
CHAPTER IV. Execution, Limitations on Extension of Maturity, etc. of Housing Mortgage Loan 
 
4. (Limitations on Execution of Apartment Mortgage Loan in Speculation Zone by Same 
Borrower) A financial institution may not newly extend a loan for a borrower who has already 
secured a housing mortgage loan against an apartment in a speculation zone: Provided, however, 
that this shall not apply in any of the following cases:  
 
a. Regarding a borrower who has already secured a housing mortgage loan, if the balance of 
existing loan against an apartment in a speculation zone is within LTV, in the case of 
extending an additional loan (inferior priority) against the said apartment within the scope 
of LTV; or  
b. Where another loan is granted to a borrower, who already owes a housing mortgage loan, 
on condition that the residential house that the borrower already owns shall be disposed of 
(the transfer of title shall be completed) within two years after the new loan is granted 
(based on the registration date of transfer of ownership after the construction of a new 
apartment is completed, if the new loan is for intermediated payments or moving 
expenses) in connection with a contract for purchasing a new apartment and where a 
special agreement that the term of the mortgage loan for the new apartment shall be 
accelerated if the borrower is unable to prove that the disposition of the residential house 
that the borrower already owns and the repayment of the pre-existing loan have been 
completed on or before the prescribed deadline. <Amended on November 7, 2008>  
 
5. (Limitations on Maturity Extension of Apartment Mortgage Loan in Speculation Zone) 
Regarding a borrower who has already secured two or more apartment mortgage loans (referring 
to household loans), a financial institution shall retrieve the loans in the order that whichever 
loan’s maturity becomes due earlier than that of others without extending the maturity and thereby 
eventually reduce the number of apartment mortgage loans for the same borrower in speculation 
zones to one case: Provided, however, that this shall not apply in any of the following cases:  
 
a. Maturity may be extended within the period of one year if there is a special agreement 
that the number of apartment mortgage loans in speculation zones be reduced to one case 
within a year from the time of maturity, and the borrower loses the benefit of time from 
the case of loan whose grace period is over if the borrower fails to perform the special 
agreement;  
b. In case of two loans, if the maturity of the existing apartment mortgage loan becomes due 
earlier than that of the loan for financing intermediate payment (including the loan for 
relocation expenses), the maturity may be extended if there is a special agreement that the 
number of loans be reduced to one case within a grace period (one year) from the time of 
maturity of the loan for financing intermediate payment; thereafter, even when the 
maturity of the loan for financing intermediate payment becomes due, the maturity may 
be extended with a special agreement that the number of loans be reduced to one case 
within a grace period (one year); 
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c. In case where the title transfer by sale is restricted for all the owned apartments, the grace 
period may be adjusted if there is a special agreement that the number of loans be reduced 
to a case within one year from the first time when the maturity restriction ends;  
d. A grace period of additional one year each may be granted in any of the followings: 
(1) In case of the loan secured by a house as mortgage to be inevitably used by the 
borrower’s parents, children, or spouse who is/are actually residing in the 
address (referring to the address on the copy of resident registration) different 
from that of the borrower: Provided, however, the total number of such loan 
shall be one case; or 
(2) In case where the disposition of a house owned is impossible due to court’s 
provisional seizure or injunction for prohibition of disposition, destruction of 
the house by fire or natural disaster, or objection to the sale by a co-inheritor or 
a co-owner of right of share, etc; or 
e. In case of the loan under a special agreement with the condition of disposition pursuant to 
the Sub-item (b) of Item 4; and the case of the loan secured by an existing house (i.e., the 
house to be disposed). 
 
6. (Limitations on Acquisition of Mortgage and on Execution of Housing Mortgage Loan for 
Minor Borrower) 
 
a. A financial institution shall not extend a new housing mortgage loan for a minor 
(excluding a minor who is married) as at the date of loan extension: Provided, however, 
this shall neither apply to the loan within 40% of DTI for a minor who has no parents 
such as the minor who is the head of a household, etc., nor to the loan for a minor who 
inevitably takes over the loan obligations due to inheritance, etc.  
b. A financial institution may extend the maturity, only one time and for maximum one year, 
of the residential mortgage loan for a minor borrower (including the case in which a third 
party provides a mortgage): Provided, however, the financial institution may 
exceptionally extend maturity for a minor borrower who has no parents, such as a minor 
who is the head of a household, etc. 
c. In case where a borrower was a minor at the time of the loan extension and thereafter 
became an adult when the maturity is due (including the time when the grace period of a 
year is over), a new loan may be extended after the existing loan is retrieved. 
 
7. (Limitation on Corporate Loan based on Apartment in Speculation Zone) No financial 
institution shall grant a new corporate loan secured by mortgage on an apartment in a speculation 
zone for the purpose of acquiring a residential house, except where it is approved inevitable. 
<Amended on November 7, 2008>  
 
8. (Principles of Deliberation for Residential Mortgage Loan) A financial institution shall, at the 
time of extending a residential mortgage loan, thoroughly conduct the credit review, by 
comprehensively taking into account of the overall credit rating, etc. based on the borrower’s 
ability to repay, such as income etc., and on the evaluation of the borrower’s personal credit  
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